US History/US History (Bureau Development Inc.)(1991).ISO/dp/0048/00481.txt

Text File | 1990-12-23 | 30KB | 480 lines

$Unique_ID{USH00481}
$Pretitle{59}
$Title{Aviation in the U.S. Army, 1919-1939
Chapter I     Demobilization}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Maurer Ph.D., Maurer}
$Affiliation{USAF Historical Research Center}
$Subject{service
air
officers
field
war
recruiting
equipment
time
planes
army}
$Volume{}
$Date{1987}
$Log{}
Book:        Aviation in the U.S. Army, 1919-1939
Author:      Maurer Ph.D., Maurer
Affiliation: USAF Historical Research Center
Date:        1987

Chapter I     Demobilization

Part One The Air Service 1919-1926

     At the Armistice on November 11, 1918, the United States Army had more
than 3.6 million men in uniform.  Some 2 million were in Europe with General
Pershing's American Expeditionary Force (AEF).  The newest arm, the Air
Service, had grown from fewer than 1,200 officers and men in April 1917 to
more than 190,000.  Seven million men and women were in the war industries.  A
nation thus geared to war now confronted the gigantic task of demobilizing.
The goal was to get back to normal as quickly as possible without wrecking the
nation's economy.

     With the signing of the Armistice, Secretary of War Newton D. Baker cut
war production, halted the induction of enlisted men into the Army, ended the
commissioning of officers, and stopped the shipment of men and material to
Europe.  The Air Service began demobilizing the same day.  In the weeks ahead
it found itself discharging troops, recruiting for peacetime service, and
disposing of surplus facilities and material.

     The Armistice brought Air Service activities in the United States to a
standstill.  Maj. Gen. William L. Kenly, Director of Military Aeronautics,
responsible for training, could not foresee whether men already enrolled would
be allowed to complete their courses.  The Armistice, he said, "has created
the greatest uncertainty here as to the immediate future." How was
demobilization to be accomplished?  What was to be left for the peacetime Air
Service? How was the transition to be made?

     Combat groups and wings of the Air Service, AEF, disbanded overseas.
Aero squadrons and balloon companies returned to the United States where most
disbanded.  Some remained active: the 27th, 94th, 95th, and 147th Pursuit
Squadrons that had comprised the 1st Pursuit Group in France; the 11th, 20th,
96th and 166th Bombardment Squadrons that had constituted the AEF's 1st Day
Bombardment Group; a number of observation squadrons (including the 1st, the
oldest unit of the Air Service); and some balloon companies.  The pursuit and
bombardment squadrons and four of the observation squadrons (8th, 12th, 90th,
and 104th) were formed into a wing of three groups (pursuit, bombardment, and
surveillance) in Texas during the summer of 1919 for service on the Mexican
border.

     Officers of the AEF, entitled to first-class passage, returned as casuals
on one of the transatlantic liners.  Enlisted men, under the command of one or
two junior officers, returned by troopship.  Troops returning from France
assembled at Brest, Bordeaux, or Saint-Nazaire, where they went through "the
mill" to be deloused and cleaned up before boarding ship.  Most returnees
landed at Hoboken, New Jersey, or Boston, Massachusetts, and some at other
ports.

     Units and companies arriving at east coast debarkation camps were broken
up and new companies formed for shipment to demobilization centers throughout
the country.  Each man went to the center nearest his home.  There he was
given a physical examination, his records were completed, and he was paid.
With money in his pocket and discharge in hand he was ready to go.  But first
he had to talk to a member of the Red Cross or Young Men's Christian
Association.  The government was concerned about what might befall him when he
walked out the gate with his back pay, the sixty-dollar bonus voted by
Congress, and transportation money at five cents a mile from the
demobilization center to his home.  He was informed that the railroads offered
a reduced rate of two cents a mile if he bought his ticket within twenty-four
hours, was told of dangers lurking in the city, and advised to go straight
home.

     Often the veteran could not find a job.  General Kenly wanted an all-out
effort to employ ex-members of the Air Service.  He asked officers to canvas
their men and divide them into two classes: those who had been assured
employment, and those who desired assistance by the U.S. Employment Service of
the Department of Labor.  The latter were given cards which, when filled in,
were collected, segregated by geographical regions, and sent to the federal
employment office nearest the place where the man was to be discharged.  The
War Department not only worked with the U.S. Employment Service, but set up a
special committee to deal with unemployment among ex-servicemen during the
transition from war to peace.  A man with no prospect for a job could be
retained for a reasonable time to look for work.  On the other hand, if work
awaited him, he could be released even though not in line for immediate
discharge.

     All officers, except those of the Regular Army, were to be separated as
soon as their services could be spared.  Release of officers commissioned
during the emergency meant termination of commissions.  As a general policy,
however, officers were offered new Reserve appointments.  Those desiring full
and immediate separation were discharged first.  Those seeking prompt
separation with subsequent appointment in the Officers' Reserve Corps (ORC)
came next.  Those wishing commissions in the Regular Army, if opportunity
permitted, were last.  About half of the Air Service officers said they
preferred to enter the Reserves, about three-eighths wanted to join the
Regular Army, and just one-eighth requested complete separation.

     Cadets in training at ground or flying schools could choose immediate
discharge or complete their training.  Those who elected to continue were
discharged and sent home after finishing primary and advanced training.  In
due course each received a commission as second lieutenant in the Officers'
Reserve Corps.

     Under pressure from a people crying, "Bring the boys home," the Army
discharged more than 1 million men by February 1, 1919, and over 2.7 million
by June 30.  The Air Service dropped from 190,000 (112,000 in the United
States and 78,000 overseas) at the time of the Armistice to 81,000 at the end
of January 1919, and 27,000 (5,500 officers and 21,500 enlisted) at the end of
June 1919.  During this period Air Service planning rested on a peacetime Army
of 500,000, the Air Service portion being 1,200 officers and 22,000 enlisted
men.  Congress, however, had not yet enacted legislation for the peacetime
military establishment.

     Many months were to pass before Congress gave a definite answer.
Meanwhile, in September 1919 it authorized the Army to retain some emergency
officers (those commissioned during the war) until June 30, 1920, but the
total number of officers was not to exceed 18,000 after October 31, 1919.
Many Regular officers had received temporary promotions in the Regular Army
and even higher rank in the Reserve.  The act let them keep their temporary
rank for the time being.  The Air Service authorization of emergency officers
was 1,200, of whom at least 85 percent were to be qualified flyers.  On
September 26, 1919, Maj. Gen. Charles T. Menoher, Director of Air Service,
distributed a list of 1,200 temporary officers to be retained on active duty.
Temporary officers not listed were to be discharged by October 31, 1919.

     The Adjutant General, War Department, ordered that all men who had been
drafted or had enlisted for the emergency be discharged by September 30, 1919.
With a temporary authorization for fifteen thousand enlisted men, the Air
Service had begun in the spring of 1919 to replace the losses during
demobilization.  "Men Wanted for Air Service" was the heading of a news
release.  "Have you a good jon today?  If not, what can you find better than
the Air Service? . . .  There will always be a large demand for skilled
aeroplane pilots and mechanics.  Now is the time to learn at Government
expense."

     A man could take his discharge, collect the sixty dollars bonus and
transportation money, reenlist (usually at the same grade), and get a month's
furlough.  The Air Service offered training for airplane mechanics, motor
mechanics, propeller workers, fabric workers, magneto repairmen, instrument
repairmen, radio electricians, carpenters, machinists, welders, vulcanizers,
photographers, draftsmen, and, among others, chauffeurs.  The future of
commercial aviation looked bright.  The time would come when there would be a
big demand for skilled mechanics and other aviation experts.

     The pay was good.  A sergeant's base pay was $360 a year.  Add room and
board ($480), clothing ($170), and savings for retirement ($500), and a
sergeant got $ 1,510 a year.  If he made sergeant first class (SFC), the total
went up to $1,690.  In addition he received such things as free medical
attention, free amusement, a chance to travel, and commissary privileges for
married men.  Compare this, the Air Service said, with the $885 the average
civilian of 20-25 years of age made in 1 year.

     Chances for advancement were excellent.  "A bright, energetic, young man
with initiative, should not remain a private long." The enlisted man with a
high school education who applied himself had a good knowledge of planes and
motors, and could pass the physical examination could learn to fly.  He then
would have a good opportunity for a commission.  Here, Air Service recruiting
literature said, was "an opportunity of a lifetime."

     Seventeen flying fields, one repair depot, and five balloon stations took
part in an Air Service recruiting campaign beginning in April 1919.  Capt.
Henry E. Reece and Lt. Nathan P. Oakes of Bolling Field flew a Curtiss
training plane on a two-week recruiting trip to Rhode Island.  Langley Field,
Virginia, sent a recruiting expedition into Pennsylvania.  Ellington Field
near Houston formed a recruiting squadron with four DH-4's to work an area
from Denver to Cheyenne, Wyoming, then to Lincoln, Nebraska, and Kansas City,
Missouri.  The 12th Balloon Company put a recruiting party into the same
general area.  Lt. Col. John D. Carmody visited flying fields in search of men
who would volunteer to transfer to fill eight hundred vacancies then existing
in balloon and airship companies.  The largest recruiting expedition in the
spring and summer of 1919, however, apparently was one led by Lt. Col. Henry
B. Clagett.  The seven DH-4's under his command flew from Dallas to Boston and
back, the meandering 3,400-mile tour through the central and northern parts of
the United States taking more than four months.  These and other efforts
produced more than nine thousand enlistments by mid-October 1919.

     To encourage enlistment the Air Service offered to fly the applicant from
his home to the nearest field where his enlistment could be completed.
Commanding officers at Air Service flying fields spread the word.  If a person
wanted to enlist, he notified the commander by telephone, letter, or postcard,
and an airplane went to get him.  The only requirements were that the
applicant be sincere in purpose and willing to sign a waiver relieving the
government of responsibility in case of accident.

     A year wrought great change.  Of the men who had become aces in France,
the Air Service could find only nine on active duty a year after the
Armistice.  The current allotment of 1,340 officers and 11,000 men constituted
"a woefully inadequate force," in General Menoher's opinion.  He recommended a
force of about 42,000 men and 4,500 officers as the minimum to meet
"reasonable requirements of the Air Service in time of peace." And that
allowed nothing for an expeditionary force after providing for the training
establishment and fixed fortifications in the United States, Hawaii, and
Philippines, and the Panama Canal Zone.  He asked for at least 600 more
officers and 8,500 more enlisted men to put the Air Service into a position
where in an emergency it could expand at a rate more in step with the
remainder of the Army.  No increase in the personnel authorization was
immediately forthcoming.  In fact worse times loomed ahead.

     Expiration of one-year enlistments taken in 1919 meant another recruiting
campaign in the spring of 1920.  The School of Aerial Photography at Langley
Field, Virginia, offered a learn-while-you-earn plan in a well paying
profession.  An Air Service recruiting party from Aberdeen Proving Ground in
Maryland returned at the end of the week with thirty-four recruits, all of
whom appeared to be excellent material.  Carlstrom Field outside Arcadia,
Florida, like many other Air Service stations, found the practice of bringing
in recruits by plane to be very popular.  In some weeks most of the work at
Selfridge Field (then a storage depot), Mount Clemens, Michigan, was given
over to recruiting in the local area.  The Aviation Repair Depot at the
Speedway in Indianapolis, Indiana, reported in June that recruiting was slow,
with only twenty-six enlistments in a month's time.  The number might have
been greater if recruiters had not been so careful to accept only the very
best for the Air Service.

     In the west, March Field, outside Riverside, California, billed 1st Lt.
Harold H. George as a "famous overseas flyer" when he carried the recruiting
message to the Rotary Club of San Bernardino.  Two hundred boys soon to
graduate from high school at Riverside were guests at March Field where they
were shown every department and entertained with an aerial exhibition.  Many
seemed interested in the cadet course that would soon begin.  The 9th Aero
Squadron of Rockwell Field, not far from San Diego, had little success during
a recruiting trip in the San Joaquin valley, where wages were high.

     The Observation School at Post Field, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, was one of
many Air Service activities with severe personnel shortages in the spring of
1919.  Capt.  Follett Bradley, director of the school, had trouble getting the
school organized for its opening on June 1.  He was short both officers and
enlisted men.  He sent out recruiting parties but without much success.  The
natives were friendly and interested in aviation, but they showed no desire to
enlist.  The area around Post Field was devoted to farming.  Farm wages were
high, but there nevertheless was a shortage of farm help.  The oil fields paid
more.

     Units seemed interested mainly in filling their own ranks.  The Air
Service prepared no master plan and provided no coordination between units.
Waco, Texas, became "one of the most thoroughly recruited districts known to
man." The city had permanent recruiting parties from the general recruiting
services of the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps, as well as from Rich Field, the
Air Service station at Waco.  In addition recruiting parties from Brooks Field
and Kelly Field near San Antonio visited Waco.  Having little success,
recruiters from Rich Field doubted if the practice of sending parties into
districts covered by local Air Service posts would be continued if the expense
of such trips was checked against the results obtained.

     Recruiting in the spring of 1920 brought in 1,209 enlistments by June 30.
At that time enlisted strength stood at 8,428.  The Air Service then had only
155 Regular officers, the remaining 1,013 on active duty still having
temporary appointments.  Thus, the Air Service was considerably below the
1,516 officers and 16,000 enlisted men authorized by Congress in the National
Defense Act of 1920.

     During the war the government had established flying fields, balloon
stations, supply and repair depots, acceptance parks, schools, a large
experimental station, and other installations for the Air Service.  In most
cases the government leased these facilities or constructed them on leased
land.  The Air Service abandoned some installations soon after the Armistice.
It no longer needed acceptance parks, for instance, after completion of
deliveries on airplane contracts.  Primary flying training, previously given
at fifteen flying fields, was consolidated at Carlstrom and March Fields.  The
Air Service could not immediately dispose of fields no longer needed for
training.  It needed time to figure out what facilities would be required for
peacetime, and that awaited congressional action on peacetime military policy.
It also needed time to dispose of property, including hangars, airplanes,
engines, and other equipment, at the various fields.  Surplus flying fields
became temporary storage depots.

     Liquidation of the United States Spruce Production Corporation took a
long time - twenty-eight years.  Authorized by Congress, the corporation
produced wood for American and Allied aircraft production during the war.  At
the Armistice its properties encompassed thousands of acres of timber, five
large sawmills, nearly thirty million feet of lumber, four railroads with
locomotives and other equipment, automobiles and trucks, and even a hotel.
The government disposed of the bulk of the property rather quickly, but the
contract for the sale of one of the railroads contained a payment schedule
that ran to December 1946.

     Nearly the entire aviation industry in being at the Armistice had been
created during the war, either anew or by conversion of other industry.  Some
production capacity was of necessity carried over into peacetime to furnish a
base for mobilization.  The same situation existed with regard to ordnance
material, so the Army Ordnance Department retained plants on standby.  The Air
Service hoped development of civil aviation would create a large demand for
aircraft and thus support an industry available for expansion in any future
emergency.

     When hostilities ceased, hundreds of factories in America were turning
out aviation equipment for the United States and her Allies.  Factories in
Europe were also making equipment for the U.S. Air Service.  A War Department
claims board, headed by Assistant Secretary of War Benedict Crowell, was
responsible for terminating War Department contracts and settling claims with
American industry.  The bureaus themselves, however, settled most claims.

     In closing contracts with American industry, the Air Service sought to
ensure economical use of materials and parts on hand and to keep factories
going until manufacturers could shift from military to commercial production.
It asked airplane companies to stop producing when they used up subassemblies
already on hand.  At the Armistice, firms had delivered less then half of the
planes contracted for.  The Air Service reduced the balance due, some 15,000
planes, to 2,000.  Of the more than 68,000 motors on order, nearly 50,000
remained to be delivered; it cut this number to under 30,000.  By June 30,
1919, the Air Service claims board liquidated 91.5 percent of the 5,000 orders
outstanding on November 11, 1918.  The value of production terminated amounted
to about $300 million.

     A War Department board went to Europe to settle the business of the
Allies in the United States, including large contracts for Liberty motors.
Another closed out American contracts and disposed of surplus military
property in Europe.  Much of the aviation material held by the AEF was sold to
France and other European countries.  Disposing of the remainder, the Air
Service, AEF, sent home some 2,000 airplanes and about 1,000 engines.  Among
the planes were about 600 American-built de Havillands, 1,100 of various types
purchased from the French and British, and 300 captured from the Germans.
These constituted the AEF's entire supply of good planes except for the few
retained in Europe for the U.S. Army of Occupation.  The War Department
ordered sold or destroyed nearly 2,300 other planes not worth sending home.
There being no market for them in Europe, the task of destroying them fell to
Maj. Gen. Mason M. Patrick, Chief of Air Service, AEF.

     General Patrick, a veteran of more than thirty years of commissioned
service, took the precaution of having each plane surveyed by several boards.
He saved everything usable (engines, propellers, machineguns, bomb racks,
radios, instruments, wheels, tires, and sometimes whole wings).  Patrick sent
metal parts to the quartermaster to sell as junk, and burned what remained
(wooden framework, doped fabric, and little more).  As he anticipated, the Air
Service had to explain why equipment costing the American people millions of
dollars was destroyed: The planes were in very bad condition; it was cheaper
to destroy old planes in Europe and buy new, up-to-date models later.  But
this did not convince everyone.

     With tons of equipment excess to current needs, the Air Service could
sell some but had to consider the effect on the economy.  It transferred items
to satisfy the wants of other government departments, but kept enough to meet
future requirements and to build up a reserve for tapping in an emergency.
Still some items seemed of no value to anyone.

     Right after the Armistice the Air Service set up an organization to
dispose of more than $ 100 million in airplanes, engines, parts, materials,
tools, equipment, and other items.  The plan was to sell several hundred
training planes and engines on the open market, which should do much to
popularize flying in the United States.  South America and other countries
were also looked to as possible markets for aircraft.

     In the spring of 1919 the Air Service announced that anyone wanting to
buy a plane or motor should send his name to the Salvage and Sales Branch, 6th
and B Streets, Washington, D.C.  The branch would notify him when the
opportunity arrived to make a purchase.  The offer was later withdrawn because
the branch could not handle the many transactions involved in selling to
individuals.  Moreover, the Air Service lacked people and shop facilities to
put the equipment in safe operating condition before sale, and did not want to
be responsible for placing unsafe equipment in the hands of the American
people.  The Air Service and War Department were likewise concerned about the
ill effects of competing with private business.  They decided to sell to the
industries that produced the materials.

     The disposal program moved slowly at first but was helped along by a few
large sales.  The Nebraska Aircraft Corporation of Lincoln, Nebraska, bought
280 Standard J-1 training planes and 280 Hispano-Suiza motors.  The Curtiss
Aeroplane and Motor Company, Inc., Garden City, N.J., purchased 4,608 Curtiss
OX-5 motors, 1,616 JN-4 airplanes without motors, and 1,100 Standard planes,
also without motors, all for $2.72 million.

     Many of the JNs sold to Curtiss came from Love Field near Dallas, which
also served as a storage site for surplus DHs.  The men at Love took great
pride in the ingenious and efficient system they devised for de Havillands.
Having removed the wings, they dovetailed the fuselages on the floor of a
hangar and placed the wings on racks overhead.  That way they got sixty-eight
planes in a single hangar.

     Excess equipment was scattered among many facilities across the country.
The Air Service often had to move items from one place to another as it closed
temporary facilities or withdrew material to be reworked for use.  On one
occasion, for example, it sent forty-eight Hispano-Suiza H motors from Little
Rock, Arkansas, where the Air Service had some thirteen thousand motors of
various types in storage, to the repair depot at Fairlield (near Dayton),
Ohio.  In time, accidents and normal wear and tear on aircraft and equipment
consumed much of the material left over from the war.  The 12th Aero Squadron
at Nogales, Arizona, was delighted to exchange old planes for new ones, the
new ones being DH-4's recently reassembled after many months in storage.

     Over several years the Air Service withdrew many DH-1's from storage for
conversion to DH-4B's.  One project in 1923 took 260 planes from storage at
San Antonio and Fairlield for conversion at several different airplane
factories. About the same time all of the DH-4's, along with Liberty motors
and spare parts, previously sent to the Philippines to be stored as a reserve,
came back to the United States for conversion to DH-4B's.  When workmen at
Rockwell Field outside San Diego opened one of the crates, they found a motor
with a remarkable history.  Built in Detroit, it went to France, back to the
United States, then to the Philippines, and now to Rockwell - without ever
being used.

     The Air Service endeavored to concentrate certain classes of material at
one or two points.  Little Rock, for instance, became the principal but by no
means the only storage facility for engines.  Furthermore, the Air Service
took great pains in preparing material for storage when long-time preservation
was desired.  To retard deterioration of airplanes, workmen stripped off the
fabric, applied an extra coat of varnish to glued joints, painted the metal
with red or white lead, and placed wings in racks to keep them from warping.
Motors were thoroughly cleaned, covered inside and out with a rust-inhibiting
grease, and put in a cool, dry place.  Thousands of propellers were stored at
Middletown, Pennsylvania, under controlled humidity and temperature.

     The Air Service revised the storage and disposal programs from time to
time, shifting material from one program to another as policies and
requirements changed.  By June 1920 items costing $94.2 million had been
reported for disposal.  Sales, transfers to other agencies, and other
transactions that included withdrawals for retention by the Air Service,
accounted for another $79.1 million.  This left about $15.1 million worth for
disposal.  Unserviceable airplanes, motors, and other equipment made up more
than two-thirds of this residue.

     The closing of a number of stations in 1921 and 1922 made large
quantities of surplus, obsolete, unserviceable, and nonstandard equipment
available for disposition.  Regulations requiring sales by sealed bid or
auction were changed to authorize negotiated sales for small lots costing not
more than $2,000.  General Patrick, who succeeded General Menoher as Chief of
Air Service, reported in 1922 on the substantial progress in cataloging excess
materials which, except for small lots, were selling at auction.  Items
awaiting disposition on June 30, 1922, cost almost $29 million.  The disposal
program, Patrick said, was retarding the development of an efficient,
peacetime service.

     The closure of more facilities in Fiscal Year 1923 added nearly $33
million worth of material to the disposal program.  There seemed to be a good
market for cheap planes among ex-flyers, would-be flyers, speculators, and
Reserve officers who wanted to keep in flying trim.  Dorr Field, east of
Arcadia, Florida, offered surplus Jennies with OX-5 motors for $400.  Having
sold more than 150 Jennies within a few months, Rockwell Field began removing
nearly 200 5-4 Thomas-Morse Scouts from storage to sell to the public.  During
Fiscal Year 1923 the Air Service held fifteen auctions, fifty sales by sealed
bids, and numerous fixed-price sales and transfers.  General Patrick reported
that all surplus property had been disposed of by June 20, 1923.

     Such in brief was the course of demobilization.  The Air Service stopped
production of equipment, terminated contracts, ended training programs,
disposed of excess facilities and equipment, and disbanded the wartime force.
Within a year, all troops enlisted or drafted during the war were discharged.
Coincidentally, a smaller number were recruited and reenlisted for peacetime
duty.  During the same period, the Air Service discharged about ninety-five
percent of the officers commissioned during the emergency.  There being so few
officers with permanent Regular Army commissions, some temporary officers were
retained until Congress enacted legislation for the peacetime officer corps.

     Disposition of facilities and equipment took longer than to discharge
personnel.  Soon after the Armistice, the Air Service began to abandon air
parks, depots, flying fields, and other facilities as they became excess to
existing or foreseeable needs.  For a time, however, it kept some extra
training fields for temporary storage of material.  After preserving items for
future use, the service disposed of surplus stocks by transferring some to
other government agencies, selling others, and destroying those no longer of
value.

     At the completion of demobilization, the Air Service found its personnel
strength far below the level its leaders deemed necessary for the nation's
defense.  As for material, the service retained enough from the war to last
several years.

     Demobilization proved a large undertaking, placing Air Service officials
under tremendous pressures.  These came from a public wanting troops
discharged immediately, from persons and organizations who saw profits from
dealing in surplus property, and from a citizenry and their elected
representatives ever watchful for mismanagement and fraud.  The absence for
twenty months of an approved peacetime national military policy rendered the
task more difficult.  Though of the first order of importance, demobilization
was but part of the Air Service story in the years after the Armistice.